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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
AMERICAN STATES INSURANCE 
COMPANY, 
F!a«n':.. : . .ipici. 
V. 
MILLER, ADAMS and CRAWFORD 
CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, dba 
MAC CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, 
a corporation, LONNY ADAMS, 
GLENDA ADAMS, GERALD CRAWFORD, 
DIANE CRAWFORD and LENORA 
PHILLIPS, 
Defendants/Respondents 
Case No. 14444 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS 
STATEMENT OF THE xNATURE OF THE CASE 
Appellant, American States Insurance Company, sued 
respondents for breach of an agreement of indemnity. 
DI-PO-I ,1 'AL-.A ;.-,-jrJ 
Default :udgment was er^en. i e^^ ir-st respondents 
(R. 28). After the -" ud-zrier.t , ar-reli^ nt d:s;:osea of collateral 
given by respondent? vir,-.. .: 'attempting to jive respondents 
notice or tne aispos:tion .^ ••:•_, 0 
compel s\* : ;•:"'. c'. i.r :• •" * - .djrv.nt . -
granted the motions as to all respondents 
.-v c s D c nc. e r, t s mc v e a t c 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondents seek to have the lower court's granting 
of the motions to compel satisfaction upheld. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
On May 14, 1973, appellant and respondents entered 
into an agreement under which respondents agreed to indemnify 
appellants for any amounts appellants might have to pay on a 
contract bond in connection with a construction project on 
the LDS temple in St. George, Utah (R. 29-30). When it 
became apparent that appellant would have to pay on the con-
tract bond, respondent MAC Construction Company assigned to 
appellant an interest in two mechanics1 liens filed by MAC 
Construction Company on another construction project, the 
Sunstone Condominiums, as collateral security on the obliga-
tion of respondents to indemnify appellant (R. 65-67, 61, 121). 
The fair market value of the liens was in excess of $13,676.08 (R.117) 
Appellant then made payments under the bond of $13,363.65 
(R. 1-2). 
Appellant filed a complaint on April 12, 1974 in 
the District Court of Washington County, State of Utah, to 
collect the amount paid under the bond pursuant to the agree-
ment to indemnify (R. 1-11). Default judgment was entered 
against respondents in the amount of $14,528.38, plus 
interest and $1,500 attorneys1 fees (R. 28). The $14,528.38 
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included the full $13,676.08 value of the liens as principal 
amount, although only $13,336.65 of payments were made by 
appellant on the bond (R. 2). The remainder of the $14,528.38 
consisted of interest to date of judgment and costs of suit 
(R. 23). The agreement of indemnity was reduced to judgment 
(R. 29-30). The November 11, 1974 Supplemental Order men-
tioned by appellant in its brief at page 4 does not appear of 
record. The only mention of the Order on the record is in an 
affidavit at R. 62-
Respondents failed to respond to the trial pro-
ceedings initiated by appellant because Mr. Crawford, presi-
dent of MAC Construction Company, was under the impression 
that the transfer of the mechanicsT liens to appellant satis-
fied respondents' obligation to appellant under the indemnity 
agreement (R. 78), and because Mr. Crawford was under the 
mistaken impression, after talking with appellant's attorney, 
that MAC Construction was being sued merely as a formality 
to enable appellant to enforce its liens against the Sunstone 
project (R. 78-79). Respondent Lenora Phillips claimed not 
to have been properly served with process, but the trial 
court denied her motion to vacate judgment (R. 132). 
The Sunstone Condominium project was taken over by 
Central Valley Development, a corporation. Central Valley 
Development entered into an agreement with the lienors on 
the Sunstone property in July of 1974, whereby the lienors 
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released their liens on certain condominium units in exchange 
for a pro-rata share of the proceeds of sale of all yet unsold 
units (R. 85-91). Central Valley later claimed that the 
mechanics1 liens on the Sunstone project filed by MAC 
Construction Company were invalid and that the amounts 
claimed by MAC were grossly exaggerated (_R, 62) . Appellant 
made no attempt to contact any of the respondents, but uni-
laterally disposed of the mechanics1 liens given by respondents 
as collateral security. Appellant accepted $6,666.00 from 
Central Valley to release the liens (R. 68). Appellant never 
offered the liens to any other buyer (R. 79). Appellant 
could have notified respondents since an agent of appellant 
had Mr. Crawford's mailing address, and Mr. CrawfordTs for-
warding address had been left with the Post Office (R. 117). 
Nevertheless, appellants never contacted any of the respond-
ents (R. 79, 118). 
The trial court issued an order on December 30, 
1975, granting respondents' motions to compel satisfaction of 
judgment on the grounds that appellant unilaterally compro-
mised and discounted the liens without any effort to give 
notice to respondents as required by §70A-9-504, Utah Code 
Ann., which notice could not be waived (R. 130-131). This 
order was extended, on January 22, 1976, to all of the 
respondents (R. 136-137). 
_/! _ 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE DOCTRINE OF RES JUDICATA DOES NOT BAR 
THE MOTION TO COMPEL SATISFACTION OF JUDGMENT 
Respondents' motion to compel satisfaction of judg-
ment was not an attempt to set aside the default judgment 
(R. 28) entered against them by belatedly raising affirmative 
defenses which should have been filed prior to judgment. 
Rather, respondents were merely seeking to have the judgment 
declared paid after appellant had unilaterally and without 
notice to respondents, disposed of the collateral security 
provided by respondents. Respondents' contention was that the 
appellant had paid off $6,666.00 of the judgment by disposing 
of the collateral for that sum after the judgment had been 
rendered, and that the Utah Uniform Commercial Code barred the 
appellant from collecting the excess. This is not an untimely 
affirmative defense barred by the doctrine of res judicata. 
Respondents' claim that the judgment has been 
satisfied could not possibly constitute an affirmative 
defense to the action underlying the judgment. Appellant 
disposed of the collateral after judgment had been rendered, 
not before. 
After judgment the debt is merged into the judg-
ment. As this court stated in Yergensen v. Ford, 16 Utah 2d 
397, 402 P.2d 696, 697 (1965): 
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[W]hen a valid and final judgment for the payment 
of money is rendered, the original claim is extin-
guished, and a new cause of action on the judgment 
is substituted for it. In such a case, the original 
claim loses its character and identity and is 
merged in the judgment (emphasis added). ~~ 
See also Adams v. Davies, 107 Utah 579, 156 P.2d 207 (1945). 
Moreover, recovery upon a judgment can be resisted on the 
grounds that it has ceased to be obligatory because of pay-
ment or other discharge. Milwaukee County v. M. E. White Co., 
296 U.S. 268, 275 (1935); Tingwall v. King Hill Irr. Dist., 
66 Idaho 76, 155 P.2d 605 (1945); Dyal v. Dyal, 65 Ga.App. 
359, 16 S.E.2d 53 (1941). Applying collateral security will 
reduce or eliminate the debt on the judgment. In re Alburtis 
Silk Ribbon Mills, 243 F. 777 (E.D. Pa. 1917); First National 
Bank of Custer City v. Calkins, 12 S.D. 411, 81 N.W. 732 (1900). 
The only obligation that could possibly be satis-
fied by appellant's disposing of the collateral security 
after judgment was the judgment obligation. It is truistic 
that the payment of a judgment could not be an affirmative 
defense before judgment is rendered. Appellant itself has 
conceded that the amount realized from the disposition of 
the collateral, $6,666.00, should be credited on the judgment 
(R. 127); this, plus the denial of the deficiency of the judg-
ment, due to appellant!s failure to comply with the Utah Uniform 
Commercial Code, fully satisfies the obligation of respondents 
-*-
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under the judgment. The doctrine of res judicata simply has 
no application to this case. 
POINT II 
ARTICLE NINE OF THE UTAH UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 
PRECLUDES APPELLANT FROM 
COLLECTING THE DEFICIENCY ON THE JUDGMENT 
A. The Utah Uniform Commercial Code is applicable to this 
case. 
Section 70A-9-102, Utah Code Annotated, provides: 
(1) Except as otherwise provided in Section 70A-9-
103 on multiple state transactions and in Section 
70A-9-104 on excluded transactions, this chapter 
applies so far as concerns any personal property and 
fixtures within the jurisdiction of this state. 
(a) to any transaction (regardless of its 
form) which is intended to create a security 
interest in personal property or fixtures including 
goods, documents, instruments, general intangibles, 
chattel paper, accounts or contract rights; and also 
(b) to any sale of accounts, contract rights 
or chattel paper. 
(2) This chapter applies to security interests 
created by contract including pledge, assignment, 
chattel mortgage, chattel trust, trust deed, fac-
tor's lien, equipment trust, conditional sale, 
trust receipt, other lien or title retention con-
tract and lease or consignment intended as security. 
This chapter does not apply to statutory liens 
except as provided in Section 70A-9-310. 
(3) The application of this chapter to a security 
interest in a secured obligation is not affected by 
the fact that the obligation is itself secured 
by a transaction or interest to which this chapter 
does not apply (emphasis added). 
Section 70A-9-102(2) indicates that the creation of 
statutory liens is not covered by the chapter on secured trans-
actions. Mechanics' liens are statutory liens, under Title 
38 of the Utah Code. Nevertheless, §70A-9-102(3) provides that 
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the chapter on secured transactions does apply to security 
interests in a secured obligation itself secured by a trans-
action or interest to which the chapter on secured transactions 
does not apply; the fact situation in this case falls under 
this provision. The creation of the mechanics1 liens was 
governed not by the commercial code, but by Title 38 of the 
Utah Code. However, when the liens were transferred as col-
lateral security, the Commercial Code began to govern the 
transactions concerning the liens. The illustration contained 
in Official Comment Four to Section 9-102 of the Uniform 
Commercial Code makes this clear: 
The owner of Blackacre borrows $10,000 from his 
neighbor, and secures his note by a mortgage on 
Blackacre. This Article is not applicable to the 
creation of the real estate mortgage. Nor is it 
applicable to a sale of the note by the mortgagee, 
even though the mortgage continues to secure the 
note. However, when the mortgagee pledges the 
note to secure his own obligation to X, this 
Article applies to the security interest thus 
created, which is a security interest in an 
instrument even though the instrument is secured by 
a real estate mortgage. This Article leaves to 
other law the question of the effect on rights under 
the mortgage of delivery or non-delivery of the 
mortgage or of recording or non-recording of an 
assignment of the mortgagee's interest. See 
Section 9-104 (j). 
In Riebe v. Budget Financial Corp., 264 Cal.App.2d 
576, 70 Cal.Rptr. 664, 658 (1968), the court held that a 
security interest in a secured obligation which is in turn 
secured by a lien on real estate is governed by Article Nine 
of the Uniform Commercial Code. See also Black v. Sullivan 
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48 Cal.App.3d 557, 122 Cal.Rptr. 119, 124 (1975); Bank of 
California v. Leone, 37 Cal.App.3d 444, 112 Cal.Rptr. 394, 
396 (1974). In E. Landau Industries, Inc. v. 385 McLean 
Corp., 5 U.C.C. Rep.Serv. 1279 (N.Y.Sup.Ct. 1969), it was 
held that a mortgage of a leasehold interest constitutes 
personal property, and that where the mortgage is given to 
secure payment of a second obligation, the second holder of 
the mortgage is subject to the provisions of Article Nine of 
the Uniform Commercial Code in the enforcement of his rights 
as against the assigning party. In the recent case of In re 
Western Leasing, Inc., 17 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 1369, 1374 (U.S. 
Dist.Ct.D.Ore. 1975), the court stated that: 
Regardless of whether there is [an] exclusion of 
subject matter, there is a clear intention in [U.C.C. 
9-102(3)] to carry into all exclusionary provisions 
the distinction between a security interest in a 
secured obligation and the secured obligation it-
self and to apply all provisions of the Commercial 
Code to the interests arising by reason of the sale 
of chattel paper (emphasis added). 
See also Bank of Broadway v. Goldblatt, 103 Ill.App.2d 243, 
243 N.E.2d 501 (1968); Levine v. Pascal, 94 Ill.App.2d 43, 
236 N.E.2d 425 (1968) (in both cases beneficial interests in 
land trusts were held covered by U.C.C. Art. Nine); White § 
Summers, Uniform Commercial Code, 773 (1972); 4 Anderson, 
Uniform Commercial Code, 24 (2d ed. 1971). 
B* Failure to give notice of disposal of security bars 
collection of any deficiency. 
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Under Article Nine of the Code, there is a duty on 
the part of the secured party to give notice to the debtor 
prior to disposition of the collateral security supplied by 
the debtor. U.C.A. §70-9-504(3) provides: 
Unless collateral is perishable or threatens to 
decline speedily in value or is of a type custom-
arily sold on a recognized market, reasonable 
notificiation of the time after which any private 
sale or other intended disposition is to be made 
shall be sent by the secured party to the debtor 
. . . (emphasis added). 
Moreover, this duty to notify may not be waived. U.C.A. 
§70A-9-501(3) provides: 
To the extent that they give rights to the debtor 
and impose duties on the secured party, the rules 
stated in the subsections referred to below may 
not be waived or varied . . . 
(b) Sebsection (3) of Section 70A-9-504 and 
subsection (1) of Section 70A-9-505 which deal 
with disposition of collateral . . . . 
The Code places such emphasis on the duty to 
notify because notice is essential to the debtor's being able 
to protect his interests, for example, by bidding in at the 
sale or by redeeming under U.C.A. §70A-9-506. In the present 
case notice would have allowed respondent to challenge 
Central Valley's claim that the liens held by appellant were 
invalid or grossly exaggerated. 
Appellant argues that, notwithstanding the Uniform 
Commercial Code, the requirement of notice was waived in this 
case through the waiver of notice provision contained in the 
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agreement of indemnity. Appellant contends that this provision 
now has res judicata effect. This is not so. The failure of 
notice could not have occurred until after judgment when the 
appellant unilaterally disposed of the collateral security. 
It could not possibly have been an affirmative defense before 
judgment and is not now barred by the doctrine of res judicata. 
See, e.g., United Pentacostal Church of Louisville v. Milam, 
527 P.2d 1171, 1172 (Colo.App. 1974); Meder v. CCME Corp., 
7 Wash.App. 801, 502 P.2d 1252, 1254 (1972); Herl v. State 
Bank of Parsons, 195 Kan. 35, 403 P.2d 110, 115 (1965). 
The illegality of the waiver of notice provision in 
the agreement of indemnity was not and could not have been 
decided by the default judgment. The mere reduction to judg-
ment of an agreement containing an unlawful provision does not 
override the express statutory mandate and public policy of 
this State to protect the debtor's interests by requiring the 
secured party to give notice of disposition of collateral. 
The waiver of notice provision was void from its inception, 
and the default judgment did not clothe it with validity. The 
notice requirement was binding on appellant both before and 
after judgment. Appellant asserts that the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure, Rule 55(a)(2), made it exempt from the require-
ment in U.C.A. §70A-9-504(3) that notice must be given to the 
debtor when a secured party disposes of collateral. Rule 
55(a)(2) only provides that procedural notice to a party in 
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default need no longer be given. It does not exempt secured 
parties from giving the required substantative notice under 
U.C.A. §70A-9-504(3). Rule 55 is a rule of civil procedure 
and does not purport to govern secured transactions, and should 
not be interpreted to do so. Furthermore, in this case the 
collateral was disposed of after suit, after judgment, and the 
required notice under U.C.A. §70A-9-504(3) can in no sense be 
interpreted as "procedural". 
In the present case an attempt to give notice by 
appellant would not have been futile. Appellant had respondent 
CrawfordTs address, and the Post Office had his forwarding 
address (R. 117); but appellant never even tried to give notice. 
The remedy for failure to even attempt to give 
notice under U.C.A. §70A-9-504(3) is that the secured party 
must take only the amount collected on disposition of the 
collateral and is barred from collecting any deficiency. 
In refusing to allow the secured party to collect 
the deficiency after disposing of collateral without notice 
to the debtor as required by Section 9-504(3) of the Uniform 
Commercial Code, the court in Skeels v. Universal C.I.T. 
Credit Corp., 222 F.Supp. 696, 702 (W.D. Pa. 1963), modified 
on other grounds, 335 F.2d 846 (3d Cir. 1964), said: 
[T]o permit a recovery by a security holder of a 
loss in disposing of collateral when no notice has 
been given, permits a continuation of the evil 
which the Commercial Code sought to correct . . . 
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In my view it must be held that a security holder 
who sells without notice may not look to the" 
debtor for any loss (emphasis added). 
The Supreme Court of Nebraska has also held that 
the secured party must notify the debtor of disposition of the 
collateral as a condition precedent to recovering a deficiency. 
In Bank of Gering v. Glover, 192 Neb- 575, 223 N.W.2d 56 (1974), 
the court stressed the mandatory language of Section 9-504(3) 
which provides that Reasonable notification . . . shall 
be sent by the secured partyft, and found it significant that 
this mandatory language occurred in the very section that 
affirms the right to a deficiency judgment after sale of the 
collateral. The court construed Section 9-504 to mean that 
"If the creditor wishes a deficiency judgment, he must obey 
the law. If he does not obey the law he cannot secure a 
deficiency judgment." 223 N.W.2d at 59. 
In Atlas Thrift v. Horan, 27 Cal.App.3d 999, 104 
Cal.Rptr. 315 (1972), the court held notice of disposition of 
collateral to be a condition precedent to recovery of the 
deficiency, pointing out that Section 9-507, which allows 
a cause of action in the debtor for any loss he sustains by 
reason of the secured partyTs failure to give notice, is not 
an exclusive remedy, and does not purport to have any bearing 
on the right to recover the deficiency after sale of collateral. 
Likewise, U.C.A. §70A-9-507(1) should not be construed as 
exclusive, nor as affecting the right to any deficiency. 
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Rather the solution to the deficiency issue should be sought 
in U.C.A. §70-9-504, which does purport to bear on the right 
to recover the deficiency, and which requires notice be given 
as a condition precedent, as the Nebraska court has pointed out 
supra. See also J. T. Jenkins Co. v. Kennedy, 45 Cal.App.3d 
474, 119 Cal.Rptr. 578 (1975); Barber v. LeRoy, 40 Cal.App.3d 
336, 115 Cal.Rptr. 272 (1974); In re Carter, 511 F.2d 1203 
(9th Cir. 1975). 
The Supreme Judicial Court of Maine agrees with the 
California cases that Section 9-507(1) does not create an 
exclusive remedy and that failure to give notice under Section 
9-504(3) results in a denial of the deficiency to the secured 
party. In Camden National Bank v. St. Clair, 309 A.2d 329 
(Me. 1973), the court explains that given the learning and 
experience of the drafters of the Uniform Commercial Code, if 
they had intended Section 9-507(1) to be the exclusive remedy 
they would have been scrupulously careful to state it. 
In Turk v. St. Petersburg Bank $ Trust Co., 281 
So.2d 534 (Fla.Dist. Ct. App. 1973), the court held that "In 
the absence of a required notice by the secured creditor pur-
suant to [U.C.C. 19-504(3)], the creditor forfeits his right 
to any deficiency against any debtor not so notified." 281 
So.2d at 536. The court looked to the common law on deficiency 
judgments and concluded that the right to the deficiency can 
only accrue after strict compliance with the relevant statutes. 
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For law prior to the adoption of the Code, see C.I.T. Corp. 
v. Haines, 212 A.2d 436 (Me. 1965) and the cases cited therein 
at 439, which are analogous to the present case, although they 
deal with the resale of repossessed property under a condi-
tional sales contract. Cf. Calhoun v. Universal Credit Co., 
106 Utah 166, 146 P.2d 284 (1944) (after granting an extension 
of time, seller required to give notice as condition precedent 
to repossession). The most recent Florida case holding notice 
of disposition of collateral a condition precedent to the 
recovery of a deficiency is Hepworth v. Orlando Bank § Trust 
Co., 323 So.2d 41 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App. 1975). 
The cases discussed here are not exhaustive of those 
cases holding a creditor is denied a deficiency for failure to 
notify the debtor on disposition of collateral. See the cases 
collected in Annotation, 59 A.L.R.3d 401, 409-412 (1974), as 
well as the recent decisions of the Georgia and Iowa Supreme 
Courts: Gurwich v. Luxurest Furniture Mfg. Co., 233 Ga. 934, 
214 S.E.2d 373 (1975); Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Farrar, 
231 N.W.2d 602 (1975). 
This line of cases, which clearly represents the 
majority rule, is the better view. These cases recognize 
that for the law to effectively protect the interests of the 
debtor, the requirement that the secured party give notice to 
the debtor must have teeth. A suit for damages against the 
creditor is not always an effective remedy since, for various 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
reasons, the debtor may not always be able to bring such a 
suit. On the other hand, denying the creditor the right to 
collect a deficiency will protect the debtor's interest. The 
notice requirement is intended to provide the debtor with a 
chance to see to it a fair price is obtained on the sale of 
the collateral, or to redeem the collateral himself. If the 
creditor will not follow this simple requirement of the law, 
he has taken upon himself any risk of loss on the resale. It 
would be unfair to hold the debtor liable for loss on the 
resale when he was not given the opportunity to protect 
himself. 
CONCLUSION 
Since satisfaction of judgment could not possibly 
have arisen as a defense before judgment, respondents1 motion 
to compel satisfaction of judgment could not be barred by the 
doctrine of res judicata. Rather, the lower court was correct 
in granting the motion because with the amount realized on 
disposal of the liens and with the denial to appellant of any 
recovery of the deficiency under Utah Uniform Commercial 
Code Article Nine, the judgment was fully satisfied. The 
ruling of the trial court should be upheld. 
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